Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1971

Western Casualty and Surety Company v.
Transamerica Insurance Company v. Dan Allison :
Reply Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errorsGlenn C. Hanni; Attorney for RespondentJohn L. Chidester;
Attorney for Appellant
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Western Causalty v. Transamarica, No. 12265 (Utah Supreme Court, 1971).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/244

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

)

WESTERN CASUALTY AND
SURETY COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vsTRANSAMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

) Case No. 12265

)
)

)
)
)

-vsDAN ALLISON,
Defendant and Appellaif.

f LED
MAR l..s.1971

-

----·-c-,~~:i~--s-;;~-;-;;;·c-;~;;t,·-u;;;;

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

John L. Chidester
Attorney for Appellant
Professional Building
51 West Center Street
Heber City, Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
CORRECTION

Page
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

0

•

•

2

•

ARGUMENTS:
~.
WESTERN'S POLICY ATTEMPTS TO
IMPOSE AN ADDITIONAL BURDEN OF CONSENT
NOT PERMITTED BY LAW • • • • • • • • • •

2

I I. THE APPELLA.i."\lT HAS COY.PLIED
WITH ALL OBLIGATIONS UNDER WESTERN'S
POLICY A.i.\TD IS AN INSURED ENTITLED TO PROTECTION UNDER ITS TERMS • • • • • • o o •

3

CONCLUSION • • • • • • •

•

•

0

•

• • • •

14

CASES CITED
Dickinson v. Maryland Casualty Company
101 Conn. 369, 125 A 866 o • • • • • o

•

4, 11

Masser v. American Mutual Liability and
Insurance Company (1951), 241 SW 2d 8560

6

Stovall -v. New York Indemnity Company,
157 Tenn. 391, 8 SW 2d 473 • • • • • 6, 7, 11
Grella v. Reynolds, 151 Ohio State 147,
85 NE 2d 116 (1969). • • • • • • • • • •

7

Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company
v. Peach, 193 Va. 206, 68 SE 2d 5200 • •

7

Schmidt v. Utility Insurance Company,
(1944), 182 SW 2d 181 • • • • • • • • o

7

•

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Rikowski v. Fidelity and Company,
117 NJL 407, 189 A 102, 116 NJL
503, 185 A 473 • • • • • • • • 0 • • • •

8

Costanzo v. Penn Threshermen and Farmers
Mutual Casualty Insurance Company (1959)
30 NJ 262, 152 A 2d 589, 592 • • • o • •

9

Matits v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company, 33 NoJ• 488, 166 A 2d 345, 349.

10

United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Company v. DeCuers, (1940; DCLA), 125
A 866 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

10

Jef son v. London Guaranty and Accident
Company, 293 Ill. App. 97, 11 NE 2d 9330

11

Fireman 1 s Fund Indemnity Company v.
Freeport Insurance Company, 30 Ill. App.
2d 69, 173 NE 2d 534 • • • • • • o • • •

11

Parks v. Hall, 189 La. 849, 181 So. 191.

11

Small v. Schuncke, 42 N.J. 407, 201 A 2d
56 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

11

Holly v. Indemnity Insurance Company,
257 N.C. 381, 126 SE 2d 161 • • • o • •

•

11

Arnold v. State Farm Mutual Auto
Insurance Company, (CA 7 Ind.), 260
F. 2d 161 •• o • • • • • • • • • • • • •

11

Jones v. New York Casualty Company,
(DC 1938), 23 F. Supp 932 • • • • • • • •

11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Annotated 1953, 41-12-21
• • •

2

AUTHORITIES CITED
72 ALR 1398, 1405. • • • • • • • • • • •

11

106 ALR 1251, 1262 • • • • • • • • • • •

11

126 ALR 544, 553 • • • • • • • • •
• • •

11

5 ALR 2d 600, 629. • • •

11

I

0

0

• • • •

0

•

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

WESTERN CASUALTY AND
SURETY COMPANY,

)

)
)

Plaintiff and Respondent ,

)

Defendant and Respondent,

)

)
)
-vs)
TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY, )
) Case No. 12265
)

)

-vsDAN ALLISON,
Defendant and Appellant.

)
)
)
)

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

John L. Chidester
Attorney for Appellant
Professional Building
51 West Center Street
Heber City, Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2CORRECTION
Appellant's brief erroneously quote the
policy of Western Casualty and Surety on page
17.

The correct language is as follows:
" • • • (a) the unqualified word insured
includes, (1) such named insured and
spouse, (2) any relative of such named
insured or spouse, • • • "

ARGUMENT I
WESTERN'S POLICY ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE AN
ADDITIONAL BURDEN OF CONSENT NOT PERMITTED BY

LAWo
The Safety Responsibility Act specifies
the person whose consent must be given to the
use of other vehicles.

Section 41-12-21, Utah

Code Annotated 1953 reads as follows:
" • • • (b) such owners policy of liability insurance: (1) shall designate
by explicit description or by appropriate reference all motor vehicles
with respect to which coverage is
thereby to be granted; and (2) shall
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-3insure the person named therein and
any other person, as insured, using
any such motor vehicle or motor vehicles
with the express or implied permission
of such named insured, and against
loss from liability imposed by law for
damages arising out of the ownership,
maintainence or use of such motor
vehicles with the United States of
America or the Dominion of Canada, • • • "
(emphasis added)
Western's policy provides for permission
of the owner rather than the named insured.
There is no question in the facts that the
named insured, to-wit:

Dan Allison, gave his

consent to Rick Lee Allison to use the vehicle
of James Maddox, the owner.

There is no evi-

dence that the named insured in any manner
restricted the permission of Rick Allison.
ARGUMENT II
THE APPELLANT HAS COMPLIED WITH ALL OBLIGA·
TIONS UNDER WESTERNuS POLICY AND IS AN INSURED
ENTITLED TO PROTECTION UNDER ITS TERMSo
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-4-

Wes tern 0 s policy specifically insured Rick
Lee Allison and Dan Allison in the use of other
vehicles when the use is with the express or
implied permission of the ownero

That permis-

sion to use the vehicle was given is not in
question.

The respondent, however, urges upon

the Court that the Court should read into the
policy a provision requiring, not merely use
by permission, but use within the scope of permission.

Few provisions in the law have created

more conflicting results.

Several cases, how-

ever, have faced the issue squarely.

Dickinson

Vo Maryland Casualty Company, 101 Conno 369,
125 A 866, set forth the common rules of interpretation0

The clause involved in the insurance

policy under consideration was as follows:

"• •

•

the permission of the named insured."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5court, in discussing the issue, stated,
"Does this language mean the permission to use the car or the permission
to use the car in a specified manner
and for a specified purpose? These
are the two constructions which confront us and we are to determine
which is the correct one • • • Let
us see how the law construes a
provision of a contract of insurance
which invites two constructionso o •
Construing this provision in the
light of settled rules of construction, we must adopt, between the
two claimed constructions, that which
is most favorable to the insured •• o
In the presence of a reasonable
doubt we must resolve it in favor of
the insured. Between two interpretations we are required by the rules
of legal construction to adopt that
which will sustain this claim."
The Court went on to state:
"In place of a certain provision in
the policy of definite meaning it
would insert a provision breeding
uncertainty, inviting litigation,
and making the defense of a departure from the permission an available
and of ten used defense. This is
exactly what the courts and the
legislature have frowned upon --
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-6-

uncertainty and ambiguous provisions
in contracts of insurance under which
insurers seek an escape from the obligation of paying the insurance indemnity contracted for. The fact that
the insurer in this case did not so
restrict the term 'permissiong is
strong evidence that it did not, by
this provision, indend this; to
justify the strict construction claimed
by the defendant would convert all
cases of this character into a contest as to the exact words spoken
when permission was secured, and to
an attempt upon the court to convert
by refinement any use of the car into
a departure sufficient to annul the
permission granted. If the departure
were from the place permitted, be it
near or far, or from the purpose
named, be it substantial or otherwise,
the insured must fail in his recovery.
A defense of that character by an
insurer is not favored in law • • • "
The Tennessee Court faced a similar problem in the case of Masser v. American Mutual
Liability and Insurance Company (1951), 241 SW
2d 856.

The court there distinguished a pre-

vious case of Stovall

Vo New York Indemnity

Company, 157 Tenno 391, 8 SW 2d 473.

The
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-7Stovall

case had constructed a provision of

a policy, to-wit:

" • • • provided such use or

operation is with the permission of the named
insured."

The policy in the Masser case con-

tained a provision requiring permission for the
"actual use" of the vehicle.

The court inter-

pret ted the provision to mean ". • • use to
which the vehicle is being put at the time of
the accident rather than use by
See also:

1

permission'."

Grella v. Reynolds, 151 Ohio State

147, 85 NE 2d 116 (1969); Hartford Accident
and Indemnity Company v. Peach, 193 Va. 206,
68 SE 2d 520.
Similarly in the case of Schmidt

Vo

Utility Insurance Company, (1944), 182 SW 2d
181, the court declared the rules of interpretation of insurance poiicies wherein the language
is suseptable to two interpretations.
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-8"Keeping in mind, however, the established rules for the construction of
insurance contracts, to-wit: that
a policy must be liberally constructed
in favor of the insured so as not to
defeat, without a plain necessity,
his claim for indemnity which in
making the insurance it was his object
to secure; and that when words are
suseptable to 'two interpretations,
that which will sustain insured's
claim must be adopted, since the language employed in the policy is that
of the insurer • • • " (page 183)
Also in the case of Rikowski v. Fidelity
and Company, 117 NJL 407, 189 A 102, 116 NJL
503, 185 A 473, the court declared:
"It is within the field of general
knowledge that the usual indemnity
policy is, except where a statute
intervenes, framed by the company
whose product it is and that the person to whom a policy is issued accepts
it in the form offered and pays for
it that which is asked, else he does
not get it. The named insured may
accept the contract or he may reject
it
But he does not write it. So
the defendant company chose the
phraseology in which its obligation
is set forth. It could, by the
0
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-9-

contract, have narrowed its obligation but one would expect that if,
in the light of the public policy and
the general public attitude • • • ,
it proposed so to do, it would have
phrased its contract in words more
restricted than those now before us."
The New Jersey Court has also declared
the rules of interpretation, to-wit:

"The

generally recognized approach of the courts
is to give an onmibus clause in an automobile
liability policy a liberal interpretation, to
effectuate the public policy of affording
injured persons protection.

Costanzo v.

Ienn Threshermen and Farmers Mutual Casualty
Insurance Company (1959), 30 NJ 262, 152 A 2d
589, 592.
There has been a strong tendency of the
courts and leglislatures to adopt the "initial
permission rule."

This rule has been defined

as:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

"o •• if a person is given permission
to use a motor vehicle in the first
instance, any subsequent use short
of theft or the like while it remains
in his possession, thQugh not within
the contemplation of the parties, is
a permissive use within th~ terms of
an onmibus clause • • • " Matits v.
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company,
33 N. J. 488, 166 A 2d 345, 349.

New Jersey, in the Matits case, put its
finger on the precise problem:
"• •• It is our view that these
later rules making coverage turn on
the scope of permission given in the
first instance renders coverage
uncertain in many cases, foster litigation as to the existence or extent
of any alleged deviations, and altimately inhibit achievement of the
legislative goals. We think that the
'initial permission' rule best
effectuates the legislative policy
of providing certain and maximum coverage and is consistent with the language
of the standard omnibus clause in
automobile insurance policies."
See also:

United States Fidelity and

Guaranty Company v. DeCuers, (1940; DCLA), 125
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-llA 866; Jefson v. London Guaranty and Accident
Company, 293 Ill. App. 97, 11 NE 2d 993; Fireman's Fund Indemnity Company v. Freeport Insurance Company, 30 Illo App. 2d 69, 173 NE 2d 534;
Parks v. Hall, 189 La. 849, 181 So. 191; Small
v. Schuncke, 42 N.J. 407, 201 A 2d 56; Holly V•
Indemnity Insurance Company, 257 NoC• 381, 126
SE 2d 161; Dickinson v. Great American Indemnity
Company, 296 Mass. 368, 6 NE 2d 439; Stoveall
v. New York Indemnity Company, Supra.; Arnold
v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company,
(CA 7 Indo), 260 F 2d 161; Jones v. New York
Casualty Company, (DC 1938), 23 F. Supp 932;
72 ALR 1398, 1405; 106 ALR 1251, 1262; 126 ALR
544, 553; 5 ALR 2d 600, 629.
The issue is before the Court for the
first time in Utah so far as can be determined
by the authoro

It is urged upon the court that
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-12a strict interpretation of the permission
required serves a public purpose.

It is even

intimated that in the event a driver goes
beyond the scope of his permission that the
owner does not then desire to extend protection
to the driver.

It seems most unlikely that with

imputed liability that either Dan Allison or
James Maddox would intend that the policy not
provide coverage in such case.

It is further

suggested that such a rule may in some manner
reward the insured by obtaining for him reduced premiums as a result of the alleged
resultant low level of accidents.

The ob-

vious conclusion, however, is that such a rule
completely removes the coverage from the control
of these persons who are imputedly liable for
any injuries that occur, and further, leaves
the injured without recourse in many cases.
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.-13To suggest to this court that it is good for
the insured that the court rule that he is not
covered by his insurance policy that he bought
and paid for seems to require no response 0
Transamerica's policy designates the ine
sured as follows:
"• •• (b) with respect to an unowned
automobile, o • • (2) any relative,
but only with respect to a private
passenger automobile or trailer, provided its actual operation or (if he
is not operating) the other actual
use thereof is with the permission,
or reasonably believed to be with
the permission, of the owner and is
within the scope of such permission,
and (3) any other person or organization not owning or hiring the
automobile, but only with respect
to his or its liability because of
acts or of missions of an insured
under (b) (1) or (2) above.
Since the issue of an emergency (stranted
motorist) was never discussed, did the driver
(16 year-old Rick Allison) reasonably believe
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-14that he was forbidden by James Maddox or Dan
Allison from assisting the stranted motorist?
The scope of permission is a question of fact
for the jury.

Stowe v. Hawkeye Casualty

pany of DesMoines, Iowa, 193 F 2d 255.

Co~

Both

James Maddox and Dan Allison are available to
testify.

Such testimony would show a consistent

pattern and history, all of which the driver
was exposed to, of assistance and accommodation
to parties in need.
CONCLUSION
The Court should not read into a policy
language that defeats the public policy or that
leads to uncertainty and confusion.

If the

policy of Western's had intended that scope of
permission be a part thereof, it would have so
provided.

In any event, Utah should adopt the

"initial permission" rule.

The facts in the
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-15case are without dispute; permission was given.
Certainly the clear language of Western Casualty's
policy imposed no greater burden upon the appellanto

The issue.of the stranted motorist was

never discussed.

There is sufficient evidence

that this driver could have reasonably believed
that such assistance was permittedo

The deci-

sioh of the trial court on the Motion for Summary Judgment of the respondents should be
reversed.

The appellantvs Motion for Summary

Judgment should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
John L. Chidester
Attorney for Appellant
Dan Allison
51 West Center Street
Heber City, Utah
84032
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